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Can Animals be Moral Agents? 
Can animals act as moral agents? 
Can they be held to have fulfilled or 
derelicted moral obligations, or to 
have acted rightly or wrongly? Li ke 
most philosophical problems, it all 
depends. Worse, Ii ke the great 
majority of philosophical problems, it 
depends not just on empirical facts, 
but on the interpretation one places 
on such facts. One can point to 
instances in animal behavior of con-
cern, kindness, loyalty, and even of 
a more or less rudimentary sense of 
justice. From one point of view, that 
pretty well settles the matter. Evi-
dently some animals can be moral 
agents. (Some animals. One gener-
ally has in mind dogs or primates 
rather than cockroaches or proto-
zoans.) That some animals can be 
moral agents would follow from various 
ethical theories, including Humean 
style ethical theories according to 
which morality turns on acting or not 
acting in accordance with certain basic 
desires, chiefly benevolent ones. 
Some of the higher animals appear to 
have the approved desires, and even 
have behavior patterns remarkably 
similar to our own. 
That animals can be moral agents 
will not, for various reasons, be 
acceptable to everyone. We may hold 
that only human actions are morally 
significant, that animals cannot act as 
moral agents whatever their motiva-
tions. Unless we are content to rest 
on mere prejudice, however, we must 
be able to point to some morally sig-
nificant difference between humans 
and even the highest animals (or 
between their motivations). The dif-
ferences most commonly seized upon 
involve rationality or linguistic ability. 
This approach is often used for dis-
tinct, though not always distin-
guished, purposes: to establish 
humans as the sole moral agents, and 
to establish humans as the sole objects 
of moral concern. It is the former 
point which I address. 1 
One thing very commonly said to 
make rational (or linguistic) beings, 
but not rhesus monkeys, capable of 
moral agency is that only they can act 
from principle rather than from desire 
or impulse. I shall argue that moral 
agency does not requ ire acting from 
principle. In so arguing, I shall 
explore a few basic points about what 
is involved in acting from principle. 
Once I have made a case that moral 
agency does not require acting from 
principle, I shall argue that some ani-
mals can act as moral agents. I shall 
then argue that moral agency does not 
requi re linguistic ability or . human 
levels of rationality and that any rea-
son for concluding that animals cannot 
be moral agents will apply equally to 
humans-which I take to be a reductio 
ad absu rdum-or else are bad reasons 
on other grounds. I shall take the 
position that, in general, a being acts 
as a moral agent when (I am not 
claiming "only if") it respects the 
interests of (some) others as well as, 
or, to some degree, in preference to 
its own. 
******** 
As an entry to a discussion of 
whether acting on principle is the 
core of moral agency, I shall review 
some standard criticisms of Kiwtian 
ethics. 2 Now, Kant tried to derive 
morality from reason. He held that 
what is morally right is acting in 
accordance with principle as such, 
doing so because acting in accordance 
with principle is the right thing to 
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do. Not just any proposed principle 
will do. Acting in accordance with 
principle as such requires us to act 
only in accordance with that which 
can be willed as a universal rule. 
This has the salutary effect of militat-
ing against morally irrelevant personal 
exceptions to moral rules. Still, we 
can consistently generalize rules which 
do not appear to have genuine ethical 
content, such as the rule that all 
tea-drinkers should use lemon when 
available. Worse, one can universalize 
rules which seem quite immoral-that all 
people are to be killed at age forty-
five, for instance. The moral value 
of acting on principle, or doing one's 
duty, is suspended in mid-air unless 
there is some moral value to make 
one's duty one's duty or to give one's 
principle moral content. Otherwise, 
why should, say, being kind as a 
matter of principle be better than 
drinking tea as a matter of principle. 
Hume criticized this style of ethics 
prior to Kant and pointed out that "to 
suppose, that the mere regard to the 
vi rtue of action, may be the fi rst 
motive ... is to reason in a circle .... An 
action must be virtuous before we can 
. have regard to its virtue". 3 There 
must be more to morality than merely 
.acting from principle-there must be 
some additional factor which makes the 
principle moral. Kant did not see this 
point as clearly as Hume, but did 
come to a formulation much richer 
than his first formulation. The sec-
ond . formulation held that we should 
treat other persons as ends in them-
selves, and not merely as means for 
our own uses. Here we have a prin-
ciple which is universal and which 
appears to have significant moral con-
tent, being at least roughly equivalent 
to the Golden Rule. But what con-
tributes the additional moral content? 
Why should we treat other persons as 
ends? Eventually, Kant appealed to 
rationality-in the form of autonomous 
reason-as giving validity to moral 
principles. Moreover, this, which he 
more or less identified with the 
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capacity to act in accordance with 
principle, is taken both as making us 
objects of moral concern, and as qual-
ifying us as moral agents. He seems 
to suggest that his results are conse-
quences of reason, though he does 
not actually spell this out. Under-
neath lies an insufficiently articulated 
presupposition of the moral value of 
rationality. 
Kant has gone quite widely astray 
here. While consistent with reason, 
his imperatives are not commanded by 
reason. They are not tautologies, nor 
are they even conclusions unless we 
have at least one suitable statement of 
values as a premise. What we must 
face up to is that what makes a valid 
moral principle valid is not that it 
commands, or how it commands, but 
what it commands. In adopting a 
moral principle, we are making a moral 
judgment. Whether the judgment is 
true or false, or whether it is a mat-
ter of mere preference, it cannot be 
distilled from pure reason. Though it 
may very well be true that rationality 
is valuable, that it is valuable is not 
a logical consequence of reason alone . 
Seemingly, a being's rationality is 
probably a sufficient condition for its 
being of moral concern, though it may 
not be a necessa ry condition. The 
question I am concerned with, how-
ever, is the different question of 
whether rationality is a necessary 
condition for being a moral agent. I 
maintain that rationality is neither 
sufficient nor necessary. Evidently it 
is not sufficient, since moral agency 
requires actually valuing, and this is 
more than a matter of reason. Yet 
does this valuing presuppose rational-
ity? If not, then given valuing, is 
rationality in any way a necessary 
condition for moral agency? I shall 
argue that (morally significant) valu-
ing does not presuppose rationality, 
and that rationality is not a necessary 
condition for moral agency. 
For ou r action to be morally right, 
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we must do it for the right reason-
valuing the right value. Of course, 
any. right act is formulable in terms of 
some principle commanding it. Kant 
maintains that what we must value is 
acti ng - in -accorda nee-with -it - proper-mo-
ral- pri nci ple- becau se-it- is -a- p roper-mo-
ral-principle. Otherwise, we would be 
acting from a non -moral reason. But 
suppose I just act from valuing what-
ever factor gives the principle moral 
content. Why must I val ue, or even 
be aware of, the principle itself as 
well as whatever gives it content? 
For example, suppose I feel compas-
sionate towards someone and act ac-
cordingly. I value the compassionate 
act, or place a negative value on that 
person's suffering, rather than act 
from a desire for reward or other 
extraneous motivation. Kant falls 
prey to the fallacy of black and white 
thinking. Since we must not act from 
bad or neutral motivation, we must 
act, he concludes, from devotion to 
the principle itself. He by-passes the 
possibility of acting directly from 
whatever factor gives the principle 
moral content. It would seem at least 
plausible that one might so act. Let 
. us consider a case where animals 
might possibly be said to. do so, and 
ask whether they would thereby qual-
ify as moral agents. 
In his thought-provoking article, 
"Do Animals Have a Right to Lib-
erty?", James Rachels describes 
experiments which show that many 
rhesus monkeys tend to avoid giving 
electrical shocks to other mon keys in 
circumstances which have been con-
trived in such a way that thei r 
obtaining food causes the shocks to 
the other mon keys. 4 Some mon keys 
will go hungry for a considerable 
length of time rather than shock, or 
run the risk of shocking, their fellow 
mon keys. Interestingly from a "do 
unto others" point of view, monkeys 
which have previously been at the 
receiving end of the shocks are par-
ticularly reluctant to cause shocks to 
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other mon keys. There seems a prima 
facie case that a mon key who is rei uc-
tant to cause pain to his fellow mon-
key is acting in accordance with 
something like the Golden Rule or the 
Kantian principle of treating others as 
ends in themselves. Certainly from a 
Humean point of view the monkey 
would appear to be motivated by mor-
ally commendable compassionate incli-
nations and, indeed, to be acting as a 
moral agent. However, the monkey 
cannot state the moral principle 
according to which he was seemingly 
acting, presumably not even in what-
ever, if any, internal thought lan-
guage the monkey might employ. 
From a Kantian point of view this 
would mean that the mon key is not a 
moral agent after all. Instead of act-
ing from devotion to moral principle, 
the monkey was merely acting from a 
morally neutral aversion to his fellow 
mon key's having to suffer. The mon-
key, could he find the words, might 
well lament with Schiller: 
Gladly I serve my friends, but 
alas I do it with pleasure, 
Hence I am plagued with doubt 
that I am not a vi rtuous per-
son. 5 
The point of this sort of objection 
is that the monkey is not properly a 
moral agent because he has no rea-
soned conviction that he is acting 
rightly, having no conception of right 
and wrong at all. Not intending to 
act rightly, the monkey cannot be a 
moral agent. Now, we might as well 
grant the highly probable, though 
unprovable, assumption that even the 
best of mon keys have no abstract 
conception of right and wrong. Mor-
eoever, we must recognize that critical 
thinking about what we do, based on 
some conception of right and wrong, 
can be an extremely useful aid to 
moral agency. If we do not think 
about what we do, even the most 
benevolent of impulses can go astray. 
Still, reason is not enough to make 
one a moral agent. (Some psychotics 
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are quite rational, yet accept few if 
any values as values.) To be a moral 
agent acting morally, one must, at 
Some point, be aware of and act in 
accordance with some morally signifi-
cant differentiating factor. Not only 
is this a necessary condition for being 
a moral agent, but, I shall maintain, 
it is a sufficient condition as well. 
Consider: why is it that people, 
rational, language-using, concept-for-
ming people, accept a moral principle? 
Let us take the Golden Rule, for 
instance. Do those who accept it do 
so because it is a principle, a univer-
sal rule, consistent with reason? It is 
all of these things, but so is the mor-
ally neutral rule that people should 
wear blue on Tuesday when possible. 
Even if it were necessary that moral 
rules be universalizable, we would 
still need an awareness of which uni-
versal rules had moral content. One 
accepts. the Golden Rule as a guide to 
action because the acts it endorses or 
condemns appear to be good or bad. 
At least in the first instance, we do 
not agree to instances on the basis of 
the rule, but accept the rule on the 
basis that the sort of instances it 
commands or forbids seem to be, in 
truth, good or bad. To be sure, we 
very often make moral applications on 
the basis or rules, and accept rules 
on the basis of other rules, but 
sooner or later, rules are grounded in 
their applications. Of course the Gol-
den Rule, in its Christian, Kantian, 
or other formulations, is more than 
just a rule of the do so-and-so vari-
ety. Unlike that sort of rule, the 
Golden Rule provides a means for 
testing di rectly whether a proposed 
act is appropriate, which is, so to 
speak, to put ourselves in the other's 
place. Still, the point remains that 
we accept such a test, rather than 
some other test, because it gives good 
results. Test or principles (whether 
or not they can ultimately be distin-
guished) must have some grounds for 
being accepted. We can no more spin 
ethics out of a priori reason than we 
can physics. At least some acts have 
to be right before we can sensibly ask 
which principles are right. (A mem-
ber of a set does not acquire proper-
ties because it is a member. Rather, 
the properties of the set are deter-
mined by the members.) 
Let us go back to that point about 
the mon key not being a moral agent 
because he/it does not intend to act 
rightly. There is an ambiguity in 
this notion of intending to do the 
right things.· It can mean either 
(a) Intending to do whatever 
act is right (based on a con-
cept of rightness, with the 
intention of doing the right 
thing because it is right); or 
(b) Intending to do that par-
ticu la r act wh ich, as it hap-
pens, is the right th ing. 
As Kant and people who think along 
similar lines have pointed out, one can 
do (b) from the wrong motive. That 
of course is true. For that reason 
they have maintained that moral 
agency requires doing (a). Cer-
tainly, as we have noted, doing (a) is 
sufficient for being a moral agent. 
Still, this is to overlook the possibil-
ity of doing (b) from the right 
motive. (Indeed, by the preceding 
argument, being able to do that is 
necessary for being able to do (a).) 
We may do (b), motivated by an 
awareness of the factor that makes the 
right act right-even if, like the mon-
key, we cannot state what it is, and 
have no abstract conception of right 
and wrong. 6 From this point of view, 
the mon key acted rightly from the 
right motivation, and so could be said 
to be a moral agent. 
Humans and possibly other rational 
beings exercise moral agency more 
extensively than lesser beings insofar 
as they can better understand the 
nature, ramifications, and conse-
quences of a given act, and of thei r 
own motivation. Now, whether ration-
ality in fact always is an asset in 
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moral agency is highly doubtful, but 
that it can be an asset is beyond dis-
pute. Rational beings can understand 
things which less rational beings can-
not, and this will clearly affect their 
moral agency. Those who know facts 
and understand issues have a greater 
opportunity, and responsibility, to do 
right than those who do not. So 
much is obvious. Moral responsibility 
and opportunity are greater among 
wise men than among dolts, and 
greater among (at least most) human 
beings than among lesser animals. 
Yet it can be argued that since only 
rational beings can know that what 
they are doing is right, only they 
can, at their varying levels, be moral 
agents. Presumably the compassionate 
rhesus monkey does not know that he 
is acting rightly. (The same might be 
the case with a child or some other 
person, who wou Id by that token not 
be exercising moral agency.) Now, 
there is a very important and valid 
point here, but one wh ich can, I 
believe, lead us rapidly astray. For 
an act to be a morally good act, 
rather than some other kind of act, 
the agent must do the act because 
he/she/it is aware of and values, 
positively or negatively, the morally 
significant factors involved-e.g., 
avoidable suffering . However, this 
does not mean that the agent must be 
aware that it is acting rightly, or that 
anything. As we have noted, intel-
lectual knowledge-derived from princi-
ple or otherwise-can be morally use-
ful, but an animal can (often) directly 
be aware of what makes a given act 
right or wrong. It may not know that 
these factors are morally significant, 
or that anything, but animals clearly 
can be aware of things and act 
accordingly, even though they cannot 
entertain propositions and principles 
about them. What I affi rm then, is 
that awareness of morally relevant 
factors in a given situation, and car-
ing about them, is sufficient for moral 
agency and does not require "knowl-
edge that". Unless our moral 
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principles only dangle in an a priori 
vacuum, they, like the principles of 
physics, must, sooner or later, be 
grounded in some direct valuing. 
Any version of the Golden Rule must 
be grounded on a direct valuing of 
the negative value of the suffering of 
others, or of the positive value of the 
wellbeing of others. Without such 
valuing we cannot distinguish that 
principle from morally· neutral ones. 
Even with this valuing the monkey 
cannot derive the principle, but he 
can act in accordance with those fac-
tors which make the principle moral. 
Being aware of and caring about the 
suffering of the other mon key, and 
acting accordingly, the monkey is act-
ing as a moral agent. 
Those who would restrict moral 
agency to beings of human levels of 
rationality, particularly beings with 
linguistic competence, may well 
counter by claiming that if a being 
does not know, or even think, that it 
is acting rightly, it cannot be a moral 
agent. Even if the being knows the 
right thing and intends to do the 
right thing because of whatever fac-
tors makes it right, it cannot be a 
moral agent because it does not act on 
the basis of concepts of right and 
wrong. Why this should be a 
requirement for moral agency is far 
from clear. (We recognise that birds 
use and react to colors even though 
they do not have abstract color con-
cepts. They exercise, so to speak, 
"chromatic agency".) I shall discuss 
a number of reasons, of varying 
degrees of plausibility, why linguistic 
prowess might be considered a prere-
quisite for moral agency. 
Perhaps the most common argument 
in favour of such a conclusion is one 
which we briefly considered earlier. 
This is the argument that only a 
rational being can have genuine 
knowledge that what he is doing is 
right. (Knowledge, in Plato's termi-
nology, rather than right opinion.) 
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After all, both humans and animals act 
from a variety of motives, only some 
of which could possibly be of moral 
significance. A normal monkey will 
desire food, be averse to pain, and so 
on, and in themselves, these desires 
are neither moral nor immoral. Mon-
keys weigh one desire against 
another, and select that which seems 
the most preferable. Yet they cannot 
do so on the grounds that one desire 
is morally better. Even if the monkey 
knows what is right, in the sense 
discussed above, it does not know 
that it is right. A monkey is unable 
to distinguish conceptually between 
moral and amoral desires because it 
has no such concepts. Humans, on 
the other hand, can, and often do, 
make such distinctions and act 
accordingly. Clearly rationality can 
be put to morally good ends. Still, 
this argument is not enough to estab-
lish the conclusion that animals can 
never be moral agents. Let us turn 
things around: how does a human 
know that a desire is to be acted on 
or over-ruled on moral grounds? On 
the basis of moral rules and concepts? 
Such rules do not just fall from the 
sky. If they are to have any force, 
our moral principles must be grounded 
on our concretely accepting that one 
thing is better or worse than another, 
and moral concepts, if they are not to 
be empty, must be based on an 
awareness of and valuing of some dif-
ference. If this is so, then there 
seems to me to be no persuasive rea-
son to believe that an animal cannot 
be aware of, value, and act on those 
factors which give moral content to 
concepts and principles. I conclude 
that such an animal is displaying 
moral agency, even if he cannot make 
the right decision in all cases, and 
even if he cannot write up his suc-
cesses in a manner acceptable to jour-
nals of moral philosophy. He, like 
most humans, would never do as a 
meta-ethicist, but he might be able to 
do the right thing on the basis of the 
morally relevant factors in a given 
situation. 
There is, of course, that approach 
to philosophy which attempts to 
reduce philosophical problems to lin-
guistic issues. Some practitioners of 
the a rt go so fa r as to claim that 
moral terms and the language of moral 
assessment cannot properly apply to 
animals. This reminds me of the early 
psychoanalyst who claimed that only 
women, and not men, could be hys-
terical, because of the etymology of 
the word 'hysteria'. If this is what is 
built into language, then evidently 
language needs remodelling. If the 
language of moral assessment excludes 
animals, that only begs the question 
unless further reasons are provided. 
Such a view can take more sophisti-
cated man ifestations, however, accord-
ing to which moral assessment is some 
sort of a function of deep grammatical 
structu re, possibly founded on the 
inherent shape of the human mind. 
Just as we see colors both because of 
the way things are and the way our 
eyes and minds are, so we think in 
terms of values and make moral 
assessments both because of the way 
things are and the way our language 
and minds are. Those animals which 
lack the appropriate optic facilities 
cannot see colors no matter how viv-
idly they manifest themselves to us. 
Similarly, the claim would be that ani-
mals lack the linguistic/mental machin-
ery to conceptualize the world in 
moral terms and be moral agents. 
What I deny is that moral agency is 
constituted by, or even presupposes, 
a human style conceptual scheme. To 
ask whether animals are capable of 
moral agency is not to ask whether 
they employ such a conceptual scheme 
when they thin k, but to ask whether 
they can respond appropriately to 
morally significant situations. No 
doubt an animal lacking our linguistic/ 
conceptual apparatus would not con-
ceptualize morally significant differen-
tia (e. g., a conspecific's interest in 
not suffering) as we do, but there is 
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still the possibility that it might be 
able to make and act appropriately on 
morally significant distinctions on the 
basis of some other conceptual appa-
ratus. If they can sometimes do this, 
we must conclude that they are capa-
ble of some degree of moral agency, 
even if they do not conceptual ize mor-
ality in a human manner. Example: a 
human, a rhesus monkey, and a shark 
might each perceive that a con specific 
is suffering. The human may decide 
on the basis of a chain of moral rea-
soning to aid his fellow-while the 
shark (neither morally nor immorally) 
takes the opportunity to have an easy 
meal. The monkey conceives the situ-
ation differently from either the shark 
or the human, yet (without theorizing 
or human style moralizing) cares about 
the interests of the other as well as 
his own. If the mon key acts so as 
not to permit injury to its fellow mon-
key, in a manner not reasonably 
attributable to some other factor which 
accidently distinguishes compassionate 
from non-compassionate acts, we must 
conclude that the monkey exhibits 
moral agency, even if he does not 
conceptualize obligation or compassion 
as humans do. 
One very common reason for 
believing that animals cannot exercise 
moral agency is the claim that animals 
follow behavior patterns which have 
been positively reinforced in the past, 
or which have become innate instinct. 
This is a point which pertains to both 
humans and animals. Undoubtedly, 
both humans and animals can be con-
ditioned to act in certain ways. Too, 
animals do have instinct, from the 
very closely ci rcumscribed insti ncts of 
lower animals to the much more flexi-
ble instincts of higher animals. 7 That 
humans also have instincts, presum-
ably instincts flexible in their mani-
festations, is not a possibility which 
can be ruled out of court. This 
raises some important questions: Can 
all of the seemingly morally significant 
behavior of animals be ascribed to 
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instinct or conditioning? Can instinc-
tive or conditioned behavior be mor-
ally assessed? In the fi rst place, the 
apparently moral behavior of animals 
cannot always just automatically be 
written off as instinctive or condi-
tioned. In the case of the compas-
sionate rhesus monkey, for instance, 
the tendency to refrain from causing 
pain in that situation cannot just be 
written off to instinct or conditioning, 
since the situation was (fortunately) 
unprecedented, unless we appeal to a 
general conditioned response or 
instinct toward compassion toward 
one's fellow monkey. Even so, the 
fact that mon keys wh ich had previ-
ously been at the receiving end of the 
shocks showed more of a tendency to 
refrain from causing them would sug-
gest that an active sympathy, sharp-
ened by painful memory, was at work. 
Can all of this be ascribed to condi-
tioning or instinct? If so, we could 
make a parallel and equally strong 
case that human compassion springs 
from such sources. It is sheer dog-
matism to attribute all behavior, ani-
mal or human, to instinct or condi-
tioning, and even more dogmatic to 
make such an attribution only in the 
case of animals. Such dogmatism can-
not enti rely be refuted, but to adopt 
it is to retreat to a position which 
cannot be refuted because it cannot 
properly be tested. Even if we were 
to attribute all the seemingly moral 
behavior of animals (and humans) to 
instinct or conditioning, though, there 
is sti II the question of whether such 
behavior can be morally assessed. I 
answer in the affirmative. Certainly 
if a human being were, through con-
ditioning (or instinct) to come to put 
a negative value on the suffering of 
others, or to subscribe to the princi-
ple of avoiding it, and acted accord-
ingly, I would not refuse to recognize 
that person as a moral agent. If the 
instinctive or conditioned behavior of 
humans does admit of moral assess-
ment, we can as well make such a 
claim on behalf of animals. 8 In any 
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case, whether or not such behavior 
can be morally assessed, instinct and 
conditioning do not provide any 
grounds for rejecting animals but not 
humans as moral agents. 
Another word or two would be in 
order about acting on the basis of 
moral reasons. Suppose, to invoke a 
cliche, an automaton were programmed 
to determine the interests of interest-
having beings, and also to respect or 
advance those interests. Such a 
robot would seemingly discriminate and 
act on the basis of morally relevant 
factors. Would this mean that the 
robot was a moral agent? Presumably 
this would be a reductio ad absur-
dum-at least unless we were to 
hypothesize a robot much more highly 
evolved than is necessary for this 
story. (I would note, also, that it 
might be possible to conceive of a 
robot which is programmed to act on 
principle, so this sort of thing does 
not th reaten merely my own type of 
accou nt. ) Now, does the robot act as 
it does because it cares about the 
interests of the interest- haver, or is 
it merely because it reacts to the tan-
gible signs of those interests? To be 
su re we cannot know of the interests 
of others except via the tangible 
signs. Still, a human moral agent is 
concerned with those signs because of 
a concern for the interests. The 
robot, on the other hand, does not 
care about those interests, nor does it 
even have a conception of them. Pre-
sumably, robots do not care for any-
thing. This is not to say that 
humans always respect interests 
because they care. It is quite possi-
ble to imagine a human who did have 
a conception of interests, and who 
respected them, but did so from self-
ish reasons. Such a person would not 
be acting morally in my reckoning. 
Now, while we can never be anti-
skeptically certain, it seems evident to 
me that animals frequently do care 
about the interests of some others, as 
in the case of our rhesus monkey, 
and are more than just reacting to the 
symptoms. While they may care 
instinctively, they still care about the 
interests of the other. 
There are, obviously, practical 
difficulties in determining whether an 
animal is acting as amoral agent. 
Human actors can tell us (whether or 
not accurately) what their intentions 
are, or were, which helps us to eval-
uate their actions. Still, the agent's 
description is not necessa ry for an 
appraisal of the act's morall signifi-
cance. Much less is it necessary for 
an act to have a moral significance. 
The agent's having in mind a descrip-
tion of his, her, or its act would be 
necessary for moral agency only if 
moral agency demanded acting on the 
basis of an articulated principle. 
Such a claim is clearly question beg-
ging. Now, it is true that an action 
may be moral (or immoral) under only 
some, but not all, non-competing 
descriptions. Axe-mu rder, for in-
stance, can be described amorally in 
terms of muscular or molecular 
motions. Our rhesus monkey's behav-
ior can be described in moral terms, 
or neutrally in terms of not operating 
a lever. However, the agent's giving 
a moral description of the action is 
not the last word, or even a neces-
sary one. It is not necessary because 
we can sometimes rely on behavioral 
evidence which establishes beyond 
reasonable doubt that the agent does 
care about (some of) the interests of 
(some) others as well as its own 
interests, or in preference to some of 
them. The cited case of the compas-
sionate rhesus mon key seems to me to 
be such an instance. Often, of 
cou rse, doubt can remain. This 
means only that the question is then 
undecided, and not that it is mean-
ingless, insofar as the question some-
times can be answered. Indeed, if 
such questions could never be decided 
to an adequate degree on behavioral 
grounds, we could never adequately 
conclude that a human being was not 
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a hypocrite. 
Another reason sometimes given for 
holding that only beings of human 
levels of rationality or linguistic abil-
ity can be moral agents is that only 
they can grasp the idea of reciprocal 
obligation. We do unto others in the 
confident expectation, or at least the 
hope, that they will treat us with 
similar consideration. If they do not, 
they are guilty of something like 
breach of contract. It is not denied, 
of cou rse, that an imals very often do 
have expectations of another, or of 
human beings. What is claimed is that 
an animal which acted contrary to 
expectation could not be accused of 
acting in breach of an explicit under-
taking (and therefore immorally). 
Only metaphorically could a fish which 
unexpectedly ate a cleaner wrasse be 
deemed guilty of immoral behavior, 
while a human double crosser is cer-
tainly given ill repute. Such an 
argument against the moral agency of 
animals fails, I believe, to do the job 
required of it. In the first place, it 
does not seem at all plausible that 
covenant, explicit or implicit, is the 
only foundation of morality. If there 
are other factors of moral signifi-
cance, such as a value in kindness or 
(negatively) in cruelty, then the 
argument is insufficient to rule out 
moral agency in animals. However, 
for the sake of argument, let us 
assume that covenant is the one pillar 
of morality. 
The heart of a reciprocity/covenant 
scheme is that the parties to it take 
part in an arrangement whereby they 
co-operate and consider the interests 
of the other parties as well as their 
own interests. We humans attach 
great importance to such schemes, and 
a person who breaks his or her word 
is generally condemned. We often do 
enter into reciprocity arrangements, 
and we often do so by linguistic 
means. Typically, our agreements are 
entered into and expressed orally or 
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in writing. I would deny, though, 
that doing it that way is necessary 
even for humans, and I maintain that 
animals can take part in reciprocity 
covenants-both among themselves, and 
with humans. It is too anthropocen-
tric, and too na rrowly formalistic, to 
assume that such a rrangements can be 
entered into only linguistically. (I am 
reminded of children who claim that 
lies are not really lies if one had 
one's fingers crossed, or that wagers 
or other agreements do not really 
count if the parties have not shaken 
hands on them. Such views are all 
too narrow and inadequate.) The key 
question here is whether it is possible 
for an animal to live up to a reciproc-
ity covenant, and to do so from mor-
ally significant motivation, even 
though it has no conception of cove-
nant. In plain fact, many social ani-
mals do have reciprocity schemes (and 
in many cases among the higher ani-
mals, the articulated details go beyond 
mere instinct). They have expecta-
tions of one another, and know what 
is expected of them. They can act in 
accordance with such expectations, 
even if they do not have a conception 
of covenant, and even if they cannot 
linguistically deal with such expecta-
tions. The point is not whether they 
have such a conceptual apparatus, but 
whether they do respect the interests 
of other members of thei r moral com-
munity. If immorality means some-
thing like selfishly failing to live up 
to a form of behavior agreed to, in 
such a way as knowingly to cause loss 
to another pa rty to the reciprocity 
covenant, then such animals clearly 
can act morally and immorally, even if 
they cannot draw up a memorandum of 
their mutual undertaking and even if 
they do not have a conception as such 
of such an undertaking. A wolf need 
not be able to formulate the utility 
rules of its pack, so long as it knows 
and acts in accordance with them. If 
reciprocity covenants are the unique 
foundation of morality covenants, . then 
wolves tend to be more reliable moral 
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agents than a great many people. 
ObviouslY, this sort of thing can be 
written off to instinct or conditioning-
as can the articulated human principle 
of keeping one's word. Still, I main-
tain that an exhibited desire on the 
part of an animal to "keep faith" with 
its associates can be interpreted as 
keeping a tacitly-agreed-to reciprocity 
covenant. In the absence of an artic-
ulated statement of principle, this can 
be written off to conditioning or 
instinct, but so can the articulation of 
principle on the part of humans. If 
the willingness of many elephants to 
run considerable risks in order to 
give aid to a wounded comrade can be 
written off, so can human gallantry, 
loyalty, and faith keeping. I do not 
find any covenant theory at all con-
vincing as a basic account of ethics, 
but in any case, I conclude that any 
claim or argument (covenantial or oth-
erwise) which would militate against 
moral agency on the part of animals 
could equally well be turned on human 
moral agency. If humans can be 
moral agents, animal moral agency, 
while it cannot be proven in the face 
of dogmatic skepticism, can be 
defended against any attack which 
does not militate as well against human 
moral agency. If we are to be dog-
matic skeptics, nothing which an ani-
mal could do short of opening its 
mouth and discussing conceptual 
issues would be accepted as evidence 
of genuine animal moral agency, but 
even then, the dogmatic skeptic ca n 
find some way to doubt human and 
animal moral agency. Once we are 
receptive to the possibility that ani-
mals might be capable of moral 
agency, though, it would seem that 
examples of animal moral agency are 
indeed fai rly easy to fi nd. 
There is another argument against 
the moral agency of animals which 
deserves particular attention. Sup-
pose we turn things around and con-
sider the negative side: is it ever in 
order to morally blame an animal for 
the way it acts? If moral disapproval 
were never in order, then moral 
approval would appear to be equally 
out of order. 9 Now, I certainly would 
agree that one is reluctant to condemn 
an animal morally. (I am setting aside 
those unsophisticates who think of 
animals in human terms.) One cannot 
morally blame the wolf for taking the 
sheep, though it might be bad for the 
sheep and grazier. More relevant, 
however, is the question of whether 
we should morally condemn the rhesus 
monkey who does not show inhibition 
about causing shock to its fellow mon-
key. I am not certain whether such a 
mon key is to be morally condemned or 
not, though I am inclined to think it 
is not to be condemned. 
In defense of the sometime moral 
agency of animals it might conceivably 
be maintained that any good act which 
can be done by an animal is an act of 
supererogation. On this line one 
could sometimes praise but never 
blame an animal morally. This would 
be a possible line, but it seems 
improbable to me that a being which 
could ever recognize value would 
never have obligations. More plausi-
ble, I maintain that an animal which 
fails to recognize the value of acting 
in a certain way is not normally to be 
morally blamed, insofar as there is 
normally no reasonable expectation on 
our part that it could recognize the 
value of acting that way. When there 
is good reason to think it could rec-
ognize the value of acting the right 
way, we could then hold an animal 
blameworthy. Establishing blamewor-
thiness is much more difficult than 
establishing praiseworthiness. In 
either case we must establish (to a 
sufficient degree) that the animal was 
aware of the appropriate value, or 
that it could have been expected to be 
aware of it, but (as in the case of the 
rhesus monkey) the fact that the ani-
mal acts in accordance with the value 
can be very strong evidence that it is 
aware of it (and acted for that 
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reason). On the other hand, if the 
animal does not act in accordance with 
the value, it may act in spite of it or 
in ignorance of it. If we cannot 
establish that it acted in spite of the 
value, we have not established that it 
is blameworthy. I believe that our 
reluctance to condemn animals is in 
some part a reflection of our reluc-
tance to claim knowledge of animal 
awareness and motivation. (And in 
some part, obviously, .it is a reflection 
of ou r bel ief that they are unable to 
understand the situation.) If a suffi-
cient number of its con specifics were 
to act in accordance with a value, we 
might then very well come to the con-
clusion that an animal which did not 
act in accordance with the value was 
indeed acting immorally. Unless it 
were retarded (or had some other 
excuse), it would seem plausible that 
it was acting contrary to a value it 
could and should have recognized. 
The plausibility of the condemnatory 
conclusion would increase with the 
proportion of its conspecifics who did 
act in accordance with the value. 
The logic of the matter seems. to dic-
tate that before we could morally con-
demn an animal, we would have to be 
able to morally praise a similar animal. 
While I would be cautious, I think 
there might be ci rcumstances under 
which I would blame an animal mor-
ally. 
* * * * * * * * 
My conclusions are compatible with 
the view that moral philosophy can 
on Iy be concerned . with preferences 
Lawrence E. 
The Flinders 
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and the consequences of preferences, 
though I do not myself adopt such a 
view. If morality is a matter of 
benevolent inclinations, accepting as 
good that which is agreeable or useful 
to ou rselves or others, or even if it 
is just a matter of exercising choice, 
then some animals can be moral 
agents. If value judgments admit of 
being true on a posteriori grounds, 
then an awareness of right and wrong 
in the concrete, and moral agency, 
are possible for any animal which can 
in a specific case be aware of those 
factors which ground the truth of the 
value judgment. If moral principles 
have genuine standing in the real 
world it can only be because of some-
thing about the world which makes 
them moral, and animals can possibly 
be aware of those factors in the con-
crete. A theory according to which 
value judgments have moral force 
purely on conceptual grounds alone, 
and not because of the way things 
are, has, I submit, no claim to stand-
ing in the real world, and is binding 
on neither man nor beast. I conclude 
then that some animals can act as 
moral agents and that a mon key who 
is reluctant to cause pain to his fellow 
monkey is morally better than a mon-
key who does not care. In general, a 
being acts as a moral agent when it 
respects the interests of (some) oth-
ers as well as, or, to some degree, in 
preference to its own. It really 
should not surprise us that we, to 
some degree, share moral agency, as 
well as many other features, with ani-
mals. After all, humans are animals 
too. 
Johnson 
University 
of South Australia 
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NOTES 
1 It is not, then, my intention to 
try to establish that animals ought to 
be objects of moral concern. That 
some animals are capable of moral 
agency might be an additional reason 
for recognizing them as objects of 
moral concern, but beings other than 
moral agents might still be objects of 
moral concern. 
2 I shall refer mainly to Kant's 
Fundamental Principles of the Meta-
physics of Morals. 
3 David Hume, A Treatise of 
Human Nature, III, ii, 2. 
4 James Rachels, "Do Animals Have 
a Right to Liberty?", in Animal Rights 
and Human Obligations, ed. Tom 
Regan and Peter Singer, Prentice-
Hall, 1976. The experiments are 
described by Stanley Wechkin, Jules 
H. Masserman, and William Terris, 
Jr., in "Shock to Conspecifi(; as an 
Aversive Stimulus", Psychonomic Sci-
ence, vol. I (1964), pp. 47-48. The 
experimenters give the following 
abstract: 
This experiment confi rms and 
extends an earlier finding that 
a hungry rhesus monkey (0) 
will avoid securing food if this 
subjects another mon key (SA) 
to electric shock. In the 
present series this "sacrificial" 
behavior was manifested in 6 of 
10 animals independently of the 
relative position of the two 
animals in a dominance hier-
archy. It was also found that 
while prior shock of the 0 
resulted in inhibition of 
responding following the intro-
duction of shock to the SA, 
this variable was not correlated 
with the final manifestation of 
a sacrificial pattern. 
Relative . position in the dominance 
hierarchy, sexual differences, noise 
from the SA monkey, and acquired 
aversion to the experimental apparatus 
itself were all experimentally ruled out 
as influencing factors. The familiarity 
of the mon keys was a significant fac-
tor, 0 monkeys being less apt to 
shock a former cage mate. The 
stronger than normal unwillingness to 
cause shock found among previously 
shocked 0 mon keys did tend over a 
period of time to erode towards more 
normal levels of unwillingness to 
shock. 
5 J. C. F. Schiller, Cedichte, I, 
Die Philosophia (1976). 
6 As Rawls pointed out, one may 
follow the ru les of g ramma r without 
knowing what they are. A Theory of 
Justice, p. 47. Leibniz made an anal-
ogous point. 
7 In her admi rable article, "The 
Concept of Beastliness", in Regan and 
Singer (op. cit.), Mary Midgley very 
well explains the difference and gra-
dations, between closed and open 
instincts. She also ably makes the 
point that the relationship between 
beastliness and humanity is very dif-
ferent from what it has often been 
thought to be. 
8 Someone, I forget who and 
where, has pointed out the oddity 
that the well ordered family life of 
wolves is often written off as "mere 
instinct", while a woman is given 
moral praise for acting in accordance 
with her "maternal instinct". Perhaps 
we should not take credit from the 
human mother, but should throw some 
credit to the wolves. 
9 I am indebted to Tom Regan, who 
raised this question in a letter. 
